Origins
In 1955 the RAF Operational Requirements Branch began to consider a possible successor to the Canberra bomber. The advent of supersonic fighters and surface-to-air guided weapons made the high-level bomber vulnerable, unless much greater speed could be attained and stand-off weapons provided. The alternative was to take the aircraft down to really low levels, where radar and guided missiles were least efficient and fighters had difficulty in finding their targets.
The Royal Navy was also taking the idea of a low-level bomber seriously. In 1955 Blackburn Aircraft won the NAST.39 contract, and began development of the NA.39 (later called the Buccaneer). The mission profile of the NA.39 was a toss-bombing attack with a kiloton-range nuclear weapon.
In February 1957, Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys published his infamous Defence White Paper, which stated that the Air Force was "unlikely to require" any new fighters or bombers. Despite this, General Operating Requirement (GOR) 339 was issued in September 1957, calling for a new bomber for the RAF. GOR.339 required supersonic performance at all levels, sophisticated electronics and the ability to operate from short runways. It also required a 1000-mile combat radius (ie to the USSR), thus adding a strategic dimension.
The industry's response to GOR.339 was due on 31st January 1958. Proposals were submitted by Avro, Blackburn, Bristol, Fairey, English Electric, Handley Page, de Havilland, Short Brothers, and Vickers. Of these, English Electric's P.17A, designed by Freddie Page at Warton, seemed to offer the most promise. The aircraft had a delta wing, two seats in tandem, and twin RB142 engines with reheat. It was 25.6m long with a wing span of 10.7m. All-up weight for a 1800-km mission radius was 33000 kg. The P.17A was a first-class design because its whole concept was getting a good multi-purpose airframe airborne as quickly as possible, using off-the-shelf components where possible, and adding more advanced avionics later.
The RAF was hostile to the idea of fulfilling the GOR.339 requirement with the NA.39. The RAF deemed NA.39 unsuitable because it was subsonic, had a too short range, required too long a runway, and had an insufficiently advanced bombing system. HM Treasury did not appear convinced, and lobbied strongly for the aircraft.
On 17 June 1958, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Tuddle, defended GOR.339 in the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC). Tuddle argued that the GOR.339 was vital to the aircraft industry, the position of the UK in the NATO, the Army, and the Navy. He added that it would probably be "the last military fighting aircraft developed in the UK". According to Tuddle, the development of GOR.339 would cost �35 million, and it would be ready in 1965.
The Air Ministry used GOR.339 as a means of forcing consolidation in the UK aircraft industry (which was long overdue), and a tie-up between Vickers and English Electric was its prefered option. Operational Requirement 343 was written as a definitive requirement, based on the submissions of the two companies. OR.343 was exceptionally complex and advanced. The aircraft had to be capable of speeds of Mach 1.1 at 60m and Mach 2 plus at medium altitude. On internal tankage a radius of action of 1850km was required, of which 180km was to be flown supersonic at altitide, and 360km into and out of the target area at Mach 0.9 at sea level. Ferry range with external tanks was to be over 5000km, and to cap it all the aircraft had to be able to take off from 600-meter rough strips. A fully automatic navigation system was called for, to give a nuclear lay-down accuracy of 200m (50% CEP). Automatic terrain following was a primary requirement, plus a low gust response for minimum crew fatigue, a long structural life and a high thrust/weight ratio. Also required were a high-resolution radar, active linescan and full photographic reconnaissance equipment.
In November 1958 the Air Ministry was authorized to ask the Treasury for development funding. By then the estimated development costs were already up to �70 million, twice the amount mentioned in June. When the Air Ministry asked the Treasury to allocate �62 million to them, with an option on an additional �15 to �25 million, this provoked a sharp reaction. The response from the Treasury amounted to a thinly veiled accusation that the RAF had deliberately underestimated the costs to safeguard the programme. In fact, because of earlier programme cancellations, items which should have been available off the shelf for OR.343 were missing, and the development costs of all of them were being charged to the 343 budget.
On 1 January 1959 the Government announced the award of a contract to Vickers-Armstrong and English Electric for a new light bomber to be known as the TSR.2. In a marked departure from tradition, the new aircraft was not given a name. The Minister, Aubrey Jones, said that it was a "tactical support and reconnaissance" aircraft, although in all subsequent documents the middle word was changed to Strike, which reflected the fact that the basic role of the aircraft changed from battlefield support to strategic strike deep in enemy territory.
English Electric P.17A three-view
The TSR.2 was based on English Electric's P.17A, but it was stretched and developed well beyond the original. Bristol Siddeley Engines was given the contract for the powerplant, a reheated version of the Olympus called the 22R, despite the objections of Vickers and EE (who merged to form BAC in June 1960) that they wanted a Rolls-Royce engine.
The first TSR.2 contract was placed on June 3rd 1959. This was for a full design study which ran until July 30th 1960. It was not until October 7th 1960 that the full development contract was signed at a cost of �90 million. A Progress Review Committee, a Development Progress Committee, a Management Board and a Steering Committee were set up to supervise TSR.2 development. In the end, these committees proved incapable of controlling the project.
The allocation of the contract was by no means the end of the political dicussions. On March 27th 1962 the MoD called for a new review of the TSR.2 project, because estimates of the development cost had risen to �137 million. It was decided that TSR.2 development could continue, but only on condition that the project would be reviewed again when new cost estimates became available. In July 1962 the project Management Board heard more bad news: the first flight date was having to be shifted back to August 1963. The reason was highly embarrassing: BAC had failed to produce a number of drawings, and certain parts of the prototype had therefore not been manufactured.
In December 1962 the cost estimates were up to �175 to �200 million. The estimated unit cost had risen to �2.1 million, and the predicted service entry of the TSR.2 had slipped back to late 1967. The Management Board was highly dissatisfied, and suggested that BAC could improve its own management of the program. Officials began to take a cynical view of the cost of TSR.2, but in February 1963 the Defence Research Policy Committee again agreed that the program should continue. Suggestions were made by the MoD and the Admiralty that the number of TSR.2s could be reduced to 50 or 60 instead of 138, but the RAF and MoA rejected these. In June the estimates were up again, to �197 to �222 million.
In June 1963 an order was placed for eleven pre-production TSR.2s, on top of the development batch of 9 aircraft. In the same month there was a visit by an Australian delegation, because the RAAF was looking for 24 strike aircraft and the TSR.2 was a contender. Confidence was now growing, and in October the MoA gave a press briefing on the TSR.2 (it should be pointed out that almost everything which had happened in the program up until this briefing was secret). The reaction from the press was considered "favourable" by the MoA, but "inevitably there was a tendency to dwell upon the cost." The RAF began making plans for the training of TSR.2 crews.
In December 1963 the TSR.2 program was debated in the House of Commons. The London Times commented sarcastically that there were "rumours of cancellation", and official denials of this were "strenuous enough to spread panic through the arms industry". There were also questions about the strategic role of the TSR.2, because of an earlier decision that the Royal Navy would assume the strategic deterrent with its Polaris submarines. The MoD stressed that the strategic role of the TSR.2 was only a bonus, not the reason for its existence.
1964 saw more rising costs, slipping time schedules, and disagreements between government officials and BAC. It was obvious that the RAF, MoA and MoD had lost confidence in the management of BAC. The TSR.2 had still not flown in July 1964, but cost estimates were now at �240 million, with an unit price of �2.3 to �2.8 million. The first prototype finally made its first fight on September 27th.
In October 1964, a Labour government was elected. It wanted to reduce the defence budget, and also had an irrational hatred of the British aircraft industry. Thus TSR.2 was the logical (but not the only) target. The R&D costs were now estimated at �272 million, and the production costs for 158 aircraft at �469 million. This prompted yet another review of the TSR.2 program, and a number of foreign types were considered to replace it, including the TFX (F-111). An Air Staff team sent to Washington reported that "there is some reason to believe that there are difficulties about aerodynamics, weight growth and rising cost" (a gross understatement!). Nevertheless, it was estimated that 158 TFX aircraft could be acquired for �332 million.
On January 15th 1965, the Secretary of State for Defence expressed for the view that the TSR.2 should be cancelled, along with the P.1154 and the HS681. The TFX would be cheaper, although it was admitted that costs might rise, as this aircraft was still in an early stage of development. At the end of January, it was decided to defer a decision until a closer comparison of the TFX and the TSR.2 had been made. The Prime Minister announced this decision in the House of Commons on February 2nd.
At the end of March, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee reviewed its position. BAC had refused to accept a fixed price contract, although it had been willing to accept limited financial responsibility. The final decision was made in two Cabinet meetings on April 1st. An option for the F-111A was secured before announcing the cancellation, because the government did not want to be "in the hands of the Americans". The USA was willing to sell the F-111 at an unit price of �2.125 million for the first ten and �2.32 million for later aircraft.
On April 6th 1965, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, announced the cancellation of the TSR.2 in his Budget speech. The Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, explained that the government had been very reluctant to do so, but that the cost of the TSR.2 program was becoming an "intolerable burden", because the total cost of �750 million (where did this figure come from?) amounted to �5 million per aircraft, assuming a production of 150 aircraft. Such an expenditure, he declared, could not be cost-effective. He added that even the best efforts of BAC and the government could not provide any "assurance that the Government's ultimate financial responsibility would be limited".
Healey continued to say that Britain could no longer afford to go it alone in the development of combat aircraft. He went a step further when he announced the government's intention to reduce the number of strike aircraft that would be bought for the RAF. He also said that "it might even be possible to reshape our defences in such a way as to dispense with this type of aircraft altogether." When questioned about this remarkable statement, Healey admitted that this was very unlikely. It would only occur if Britain decided to withdraw its forces from the Middle East and Asia (which later happened, of course). He mentioned that the government did intend to buy a new strike aircraft, the General Dynamics F-111A, and that this could be done for less than half the price of the TSR.2 program.
The final twists in the saga are that the F-111 was ordered for the RAF, and then cancelled, and the formerly scorned Buccaneer finally entered service with the RAF in 1969 in the low-level strike role, replacing the Canberra. It was not until the early 1980s that the RAF got an aircraft (Tornado) that came close to the TSR.2 in capability.
The total amount of money actually spent on the TSR.2 is difficult to quantify because of Government secrecy, but it was probably not more than �200 million. About half of this paid for items which helped other programs, for example the Olympus engine which powered Concorde. It also paid for non-technical things such as industrial co-operation, project management and production technology. Ultimately it kept the British aviation industry in a position to build, power and equip military aircraft, which is something that only a few other countries can do. Even the latest Typhoon owes something to TSR.2
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